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Abstract 
This article explores men at a state-owned youth center in Cairo, struggling to cope with 
uncertainties and change in the aftermath of Egypt’s January 2011 Revolution. Conceptually, 
the article critically engages anthropologist Laura Bear’s suggestion that an ethics of 
productivity saturate neoliberal masculinity. As my ethnographic stories about football 
coaches and state bureaucrats illustrate, being a good man recurrently surfaced as a problem 
of how to work productively in and on time: as ambiguities between discordant futures that 
left material needs, familiar care, and development of football talents difficult to reconcile. 
Often, my interlocutors linked this conundrum to a wide-ranging opacity, conjured as 
“corruption” (fisad). My analysis of this male predicament allows me to spotlight one of the 
Egyptian revolution’s most luring promises: a transparent and meritocratic system, where a 
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man’s work would finally be allowed to work on all futures deemed morally and materially 
significant. 
Keywords 




How does masculinity in contemporary Egypt articulate with ethical norms of 
productivity, the generation of public and private value, and work intended to shape desired 
futures? How are notions of productive manhood enacted among men in Cairo who work with 
young boys? How are opportunities and impediments for productivity and manliness talked 
about and understood? And how did all of this transform during the tumultuous years that 
followed Egypt’s 2011 Revolution? 
In this article, I set out to interrogate questions such as these within the context of 
Egyptian youth football. Presenting ethnographic depictions of men who worked at or around 
a government-run youth center in central Cairo in late 2012 and early 2013, the research 
traces a variety of male projects, actions and reactions in a post-revolutionary era replete with 
change and uncertainty. Egypt’s youth centers (marakiz al-shabab; sing. markiz al-shabab) 
are a network of state-owned sports and culture clubs managed by government employees. 
First established during the Gamal Abdel Nasser presidency (1956-1970), the aim of the 
centers is to provide less wealthy Egyptian children with an affordable substitute to Egypt’s 
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private sports clubs: a chance to play sports and music, surf the internet cheaply, or just a 
semi-public space to hang out in their free time. Every markiz invariably has a space for 
playing football. At some centers, we find expensive artificial grass pitches that many times 
are a result of local businessmen’s donations and investments. However, at many other places, 
football is still played on torn and infamously slippery stone tiles (balat). The local centers are 
the location where a majority of Egypt’s best football players first kicked a ball. Traditionally, 
it was also the place where talents were spotted by talent scouts (kashifin) and channelled 
upwards in the Egyptian football pyramid.  
The article is part of an ethnographic research project about the emotional politics of 
Egyptian football, conducted in Cairo between August 2011 and March 2013 (Rommel 2014, 
2015, 2016). In the last five months of this field research period, I came to spend an 
increasing part of my time at Cairo’s youth centers, where I learned to know young players, 
parents, coaches and the responsible state employees. In parallel, I also conducted interviews 
with local businessmen, who invested in facilities at the centers, as well as with bureaucrats at 
the Directorate for Youth and Sports at Cairo Governorate, the authority in charge of all youth 
centers in Cairo. As often happens during fieldwork, my research took me to places well 
beyond the confines of the sites I had intended to explore. The people I met at the marakiz 
would introduce me to a range of other spaces and institutions where young boys play football 
in the Egyptian capital. In the ethnography that follows, we will come to know three of the 
people I met: the state employees, Mahmoud and Hossam, and Omar, a devoted youth coach.1 
The focus on men working with young football players opens up an analysis of 
masculine productive action on two distinct levels. As I will suggest below, the youth centers 
are, on the one hand, spaces where men work to make money so to reproduce themselves as 
well as social relations and kin. On the other hand, this is an institution explicitly designed to 
mold young boys into able and responsible men: a space for sport and recreation, surely, but 
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also for the making of new generations of Egyptians, set to become the nation’s future. In this 
sense, my research on youth football highlights a construction of masculinity that in part 
deviates from previous anthropological and sociological studies of men who play football 
(Archetti 1993; Worby 2009) or follow the game as fans (Hughson 1997; King 1997; Marsh 
1978). Instead of approaching football masculinities in terms of performativity, symbolism, 
violence or embodiment, my analysis is oriented towards men in Egypt who attempt to be 
productive and generate private and public value (Bear 2015). This, as we will see, allows me 
to pinpoint a particular ethnographic notion of “corruption” as well as different ways in which 
Egyptian men envisage solutions to this problem. In my conclusion, I will argue that these 
foci make it possible to rethink what the Egyptian revolution really comprised and promised 
for men in Cairo who struggled to make their work really work. 
Productivity 
In her recent book, Navigating Austerity (2015), an ethnographic study of bureaucrats, 
entrepreneurs and day laborers along the Hooghly River, India, anthropologist Laura Bear 
spotlights an intriguing notion of masculinity. Throughout her monograph, Bear identifies 
links between “popular ethics of productivity” and what it means to be a proper hard-working 
man. In an era marked by governmental defunding, privatization and failing infrastructures, 
writes Bear, men on all levels of the social hierarchy have come to consider the ability to (re-) 
produce material and social value as an essential male virtue. In order to be a good man – or, 
perhaps more accurately, good at being a man – Bear’s interlocutors need to master specific 
“conducts of productivity” and classed ideals of “workmanship” (2015, 18). Often, such 
productive conduct manifests in practices of “speculation”, i.e. “forms of social action that 
seek to anticipate the future and creatively bring it into being” (2015, 19). To be flexible 
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enough to seize fluid opportunities and shape desirable futures is imperative in the social 
setting that Bear considers. In 21st-century India, a man has to be highly adaptable and always 
ready to act and react. Only then can he “regenerate” public or private goods from the “ruins 
of austerity capitalism” (2015, 53). 
Bear’s linking of masculinity with productivity does not emerge in a vacuum. For a 
few decades now, anthropologists have analyzed entanglements between ethics, productivity 
and labor in various sociocultural settings. United by a concern for how what counts as 
“value” is generated, this literature has expanded the notion of production so to also 
encompass the fashioning of persons, kin, social relations and private and public institutional 
arrangements (e.g. Graeber 2001, 2005, 2013; Guyer 1993; Yanagisako 2002; Bear et al. 
2015). Notions of manhood are inexorably linked to such productive activities. As students of 
masculinities around the world tell us, an ability to produce and reproduce (for) one’s family 
is typically at the core of what it takes to be a proper man (e.g. Cornwall, Karioris and 
Lindisfarne 2016; Gaibazzi 2013; Inhorn 2012; Osella and Osella 2006).  
The added value of Bear’s work, then, lies not primarily in her theorization and 
conceptualization of masculinity, but in minute ethnographic illustrations of how ethical 
codes of productivity and value translate into lived experience: how her male interlocutors 
attempt to combine, but end up compromising, personal rewards and public goods; how men 
struggle to make their work and efforts really work under uncertain, often unfavorable and 
constantly shifting material and institutional conditions; and how futures recurrently emerge 
as a key variable to account for, as something men desire, envision and actively work on. To 
put it briefly, Bear’s depictions of laboring men and masculinity are dynamic yet constrained, 
forward-looking yet historically contextual. As such, she provides an optic that avoids 
stereotyping men, either as trapped in static patriarchal structures, or as living through 
seemingly perpetual “crisis,” two problematic tendencies in previous studies on men and 
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masculinities in the Middle East (e.g. De Sondy 2014; Horrocks 1994; see also Amar 2011a). 
What is more, Bear’s stressing of speculative “future making” resonates particularly well with 
the experiences of men in Cairo in the tumultuous years that followed January 2011. After all, 
this was not only a period when well-entrenched masculine ideals of productivity, nurturing 
care and acting for the public good were intensified and accentuated (Ghannam 2013; Naguib 
2015). It was also a moment in time when the Egyptians, more than ever before, found 
themselves negotiating multiple, sometimes conflicting, “grand schemes” and living “in the 
future tense” (Schielke 2015). 
As a place where state bureaucrats, sports coaches, young players and local 
entrepreneurs converge, Cairo’s marakiz al-shabab are full of men striving to productively 
generate futures and values. Here, professionals work to support their families, investors 
intervene with the aim to combine monetary rewards with social status, and boys work out to 
shape skills and bodies, so as to possibly fulfill lofty dreams in the glitzy football industry. 
Most importantly, though, the marakiz are literally dedicated to mold al-shabab (the youth). 
As I came to realize during my fieldwork, this mission gives the centers a political weight by 
default. The country’s young population constitutes a never-ceasing well of inspiration for 
debate, debates that recurrently spill over into discussions about the national future. 
Especially the male subsection of al-shabab2 – a social category that in contemporary Egypt 
comprises unmarried boys and men from their late teens well into their thirties – has in recent 
decades emerged as a contested discursive-political battleground: from the Mubarak era, 
when the youth generally were portrayed as troublesome thugs or lazy good-for-nothings, 
over the revolutionary years, when young revolutionaries suddenly became widely valorized, 
into the post-coup period, when male and youthful energies ambivalently have been framed as 
both a promise and a problem (cf. Amar 2011b; Armbrust 2005; Sika 2012; Swedenburg 
2007). This sense of urgency was clearly discernible among state employees and coaches 
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working on fostering young boys, as football players, men and national subjects. All men I 
met considered sports an unmatched avenue for steering the youth away from all sorts of 
troubles, be it violence, drugs, obesity, and the nebulous realm called “politics” (cf. 
Swedenburg 2007; Menoret 2014, 182-185). In their daily work, therefore, my interlocutors 
did not only generate material, social and interpersonal value for themselves and for their 
families. They also saw themselves act, more or less productively, on what by definition 
constituted the nation’s future. This mission was at the core of their profession, and, if we 
follow Laura Bear, of their constituting themselves as proper men. 
*** 
Let us take a closer look at what such a conduct of productivity could look like. In fall 
2012 and winter 2013, I spent several evenings each week at the youth center in the working-
class neighborhood of Bab el-Hut3 in central Cairo, watching young boys playing football and 
talking to employees, coaches, players and parents. Two men that I learned to know well were 
the center’s manager, Mahmoud, and his deputy, Hossam. Mahmoud and Hossam were state 
employees (muwazzafin), employed by the Ministry of Youth.4 Now in their late forties, they 
had both worked in Bab el-Hut for more than a decade. Although none of them lived in the 
area – well-educated men like them rarely do – they had acquired a certain social position and 
reputation in the neighborhood. Like many Egyptian bureaucrats, however, their relatively 
meager governmental salaries did not suffice to sustain the middle- class life style that their 
social capital reflected, and which their families aspired to. In order to balance their budgets, 
both Hossam and Mahmoud thus had second part-time jobs in the more lucrative private 
sector.  
In informal chats and more formal interviews, Mahmoud and Hossam told me about 
the aims and ambitions of the center in Bab el-Hut. Frequently, they talked about the center’s 
dual mission: to provide a space for Egyptian kids to play sport, and to foster them as moral 
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and responsible citizens. To achieve this, the center did not only organize courses in a variety 
of sports (football, weight lifting, table tennis, karate, pool), but also music classes (violin, 
song), cultural activities, religious education and “citizenship courses” (durus muwatna). This 
multifaceted repertoire of activities constituted a sense of pride. As Mahmoud liked to remind 
me, no other markiz of comparable size in central Cairo ran a greater variety of courses. “It is 
important to have many different things, for different children,” he told me once.  
Not all children like football. How can we reach out to them if everything happens 
at the football pitch? And by the way, sports alone aren’t enough to shape a 
complete human being (insan kamil). You need culture (thaqafa) as well. And 
religion (din), and morals (akhla’).   
One important aspect of Egypt’s youth centers, Hossam and Mahmoud liked to 
reiterate, was that they were open and accessible to anyone, regardless of social class. In 
contrast to Cairo’s expensive private clubs, these were spaces for everyone: how could they 
otherwise be a positive force for all Egyptian shabab? In Bab el-Hut, this was very much the 
case; even children from the neighborhood’s many impoverished families could afford the 
very modest annual membership fee of ten Egyptian pounds (EGP, approx. $1.5).5 Every 
night of the week, the concrete courtyard, the small internet café, and the artificial grass 
football pitch were full of young school children and teenagers. However, most of the kids did 
not come to participate in any of the center’s organized activities. Rather, they visited the 
center since it was one of very few spaces in Bab el-Hut to fool around, buy a cheap Pepsi, or 
just hang out. In fact, many of the courses, like music classes, required costly instruments, and 
the popular football academy was only available for those paying an additional fee. “It is not 
optimal; the courses are important for what we are trying to do,” Hossam once admitted.  
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But we cannot do anything about that. We hire professional instructors, so 
someone has to pay. In the end of the day, there are too many kids and too little 
space. I think it’s good for the kids that they can come here, regardless of what 
they do. And our budget has to even up. We do what we can. We cannot do more 
than this. 
*** 
One of the coaches that Hossam had previously paid to run the football academy at his 
center was Omar, a man in his early thirties who I learned to know through a common friend 
in the area. Omar was born in Bab el-Hut in the mid-70’s as the youngest of four siblings. His 
now deceased father had been a state employee at the Ministry of Supplies; his mother was a 
housewife. From early on, Omar’s life had orbited around football. As often as he could, he 
played with friends in the streets or at the youth center, and when his talent was spotted by a 
talent scout at a school tournament, he ended up in the youth team of the small Cairo club, 
Nadi el-Nil. As one of the very best in his cohort, Omar was immediately included in a team 
of one-year older boys; before long he was attracting attention from Cairo’s most famous 
club, al-Ahly.  
Between the age of ten and eighteen, Omar played regularly for al-Ahly’s academy 
teams. He was considered a promising talent, at least as good as his teammate, the future 
national team midfielder, Muhammad Barakat. However, due to a combination of untimely 
injuries and military service, Omar’s career had stalled in his late teens. Instead, he went on to 
study commerce at Cairo University, before spending ten years working in Egypt’s booming 
tourism industry. Just after turning thirty, though, he received a phone call from an old friend 
from al-Ahly asking him if he wanted to coach one of the club’s youth teams. Although this 
meant a significantly lowered salary, Omar accepted the offer right away. As he told me, 
justifying his choice: “Football is the passion of my life”, “I have always loved children”, and 
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“This was a chance to make a difference, to pay back and teach kids; football is something I 
really know”. After three years as a youth coach in al-Ahly’s academy, he signed a deal with 
Mahmoud to run the academy at the youth center in Bab el-Hut. For reasons that I will return 
to below, his spell at the markiz ended in disappointment. He left bitterly in early 2009, and 
he has not entered the compound ever since. At the time I came to know him, in late 2012, 
Omar was finishing his third year as a full-time coach at the private club Wadi Degla’s 
“Arsenal Academy” in the posh 6th of October suburb.6 Since getting married and having 
children a few years ago, he was living in the informal suburb Bulaq al-Dakrur in Giza. Yet, 
he still spent most of his spare time in Bab el-Hut, the neighborhood where he had grown up, 
where he had all of his friends, and which he still called home. 
Like Mahmoud and Hossam, Omar had noted that his occupation had become more 
appreciated in recent years. “Finally,” he told me, people in Egypt had begun to understand 
the value of the work that he and his colleagues were carrying out day in and day out. As he 
once expressed it: “It’s not just about sports. We’re working with the future every day. What 
could be more important? It’s a big responsibility.” Another time, immediately after a session 
with the kids he trained at the Wadi Degla compound, his enthusiasm was tangible: “This is a 
great job: playing football with young boys and seeing how they get better. Sure it is hard 
work, but I really enjoy it. After so many years, it still makes me happy (yifarrahni).” 
But the happiness he felt there and then, with the children at the training pitch, would 
only last so long. As anthropologist Samuli Schielke has noted, also in reference to 
contemporary Egypt, “capitalism offers perhaps the most powerful social utopia of our time” 
(2015, 124). As far as Omar’s dreams and aspirations were concerned, this was no doubt the 
case. Having spent the last three years working among the posh villas and – by Cairo 
standards – clean air in the 6th of October suburb, he nurtured a dream to take his own 
children out of the congested city center, into the middle-class life that the desert 
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developments afforded. At the time I came to know him, however, this dream looked more 
than distant. Despite working full time with boys from the moneyed upper-middle classes six 
days a week, Omar’s salary did not exceed 1500 EGP ($231) per month. Given that he paid 
more than 300 EGP ($46) in monthly rent, 150 EGP ($23) for transportation, and several 
hundred pounds in school fees for his two sons, the space for savings was minimal. Instead, 
like so many other Egyptian men, Omar had to rely on small additional sources of income to 
make ends meet. In the last five years, he had sometimes driven a friend’s taxi on weekends. 
Recently, he had begun selling pirate copies of al-Ahly track suits that another friend was 
producing in a small workshop in Cairo’s outskirts. Regardless of when and where I saw him, 
he always carried around a large bag with pants and jackets, constantly ready to do business. 
“It is tough,” he explained.  
Everything has become more expensive after the revolution, but salaries are still 
the same. No one has money. Of course, buying new sports gear is nobody’s 
priority now. But it’s the same for everyone. One has to try to get some extra 
[money] wherever one can, but it’s never really enough. 
To combine being a productive, ethical, and caring man, in other words, was not an 
easy task in Bab el-Hut. The hurdles were many; the opportunities and openings scarce. Very 
often, people understood the predicament that they were facing under the overarching rubric 
of “corruption.” This is an issue to which we now turn. 
Corruption 
When Egyptians talk about the many problems that mark the current era – within 
Egyptian football, in their personal lives, or in society in general – the topic of “corruption” 
(fisad) almost always comes up. While nobody considers himself part of the problem, people 
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will readily label institutions, authorities, people in power, or professional and social 
competitors as “corrupt” (fasid). Depending on one’s politics, profession, and social position, 
the Others accused of corruption vary. Yet, almost everyone agrees that corruption comprises 
a deep and extremely serious problem in Egypt, which somehow needs to be tackled. 
At the markiz in Bab el-Hut, these discussions were commonplace. In 2012 and 2013, 
Egypt’s youth centers experienced a period of uncertainty and multiple attacks from all sorts 
of directions. With the national government facing an acute financial crisis, funding to non-
prioritized activities within the Ministry of Youth were cut. As a result, Mahmoud and 
Hossam found it increasingly difficult to keep the activities at the center running. However, as 
they often complained, residents in the neighborhood did not properly grasp the real reasons 
behind the crisis. Instead of holding the “corrupt” (fasda) and “failing” (fashla) Mursi 
government responsible, people put the blame on bureaucrats, such as them, who did their 
best to keep the place afloat. It is here important to bear in mind that the Egyptian Revolution 
to a great extent was a revolution against the perceived ills of the state. For many Egyptians, 
low-level governmental institutions, like marakiz al-shabab, epitomized the corruption, 
nepotism, and inefficiency that the people had rose up to reform. Consequently, Mahmoud 
and Hossam’s problem was not only that they lacked funding, that parents told their children 
to stay home at night when clashes raged on nearby Tahrir Square, or that the unrest made it 
difficult for employees to get to work. Many residents in Bab el-Hut turned against the state 
employees, accusing them of being filul (remnants of the old regime) or, more commonly, 
fasidin (corrupt). For Mahmoud, this was deeply unfair. Once he told me: 
I suppose they think we take money and put it into our own pockets: that we use 
our positions to enrich ourselves. But look at my salary; I have to work extra to 
support my family. I’m sure we can do things better and more efficiently; everyone 
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can; of course there is corruption in Egypt. But the corruption exists up there (al-
fisad huwa mawgud fu’), among politicians, people with real power. No one can 
say I’m doing this for money. I tell you what: people don’t really know what they 
mean when they speak about corruption (al-sha‘b mish ‘arif al-fisad da eih 
bezzabt). 
This final remark of Mahmoud’s gave me pause. What do people in Egypt really mean 
when they speak about “corruption”? The Arabic word fisad, it should be noted, stems from 
the verbal root fa-sin-dal, a verb that in its transitive form (fassada) means to “spoil,” 
“deprave,” “ruin,” “demoralize,” “abase,” “sully,” “tarnish,” “defile,” as well as to “corrupt.” 
something.7 In everyday usage, moreover, the concepts fisad (corruption) and fasid (corrupt) 
come with an even wider range of overlapping connotations: moral, organizational, hygienic 
and, of course, economic corruption. This inclusiveness vis-à-vis meanings and practices is 
well in line with classical ethnographic accounts of corruption from various parts of the world 
(e.g. Gupta 1995, 2012; Haller and Shore 2005; Hasty 2005; Smith 2008; see also Torsello 
and Venard 2016). Indeed, as anthropologists have argued convincingly, the distinction 
between practices considered as “corruption,” which are consequently morally suspect, and 
morally acceptable actions that mobilize friendships, opaque business networks, and personal 
connections to generate value and gain power, is often a murky one (Bear 2015, 101-122; 
Schielke 2015, 116-123; see also Accad 1992). It is all a grey zone, typically in the eye of the 
beholder. Conceptually, corruption is elastic enough to incorporate everyone and no one, a 
property which, arguably, makes it so very potent in political debates. 
And yet, regardless of the concept’s catch-all properties, within the context of 
Egyptian youth football, discussions about fisad habitually harkened back on a more limited 
set of tropes. To pinpoint this articulation, it is useful to consider in some detail how Omar, 
the youth coach, spoke about development and scouting of Egyptian football talents, in the 
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past as well as in the present. Whenever I met Omar, our discussions tended to gravitate 
toward how “corruption” hindered the country’s best talents from “making it.” One cold 
Tuesday evening, as we drank a cup of sweet tea in the empty Wadi Degla coffee shop after 
one of Omar’s training session, he told me: 
Remember I told you about how different everything was in Bab el-Hut in my 
childhood in the 1980s? We were all poor, but still there was a real chance for 
everyone, just look at me. There were spaces to play football everywhere: in the 
streets, on parking lots and at al-markiz. Sure, the pitches were all balat (stone 
tiles) and the balls were bad, but there were kashifin (talent scouts) in every 
neighborhood, so if someone was really good, a club would pick him up. That’s 
what happened to me, remember? In the end, the boys who had talents and passion 
to train made it. Everyone had a chance.  
Since the days of Omar’s childhood in Bab el-Hut, however, the game’s capability to channel 
boys with talent towards richness and glory had gradually been diluted. Life might well have 
been hugely unfair also in the 1970s and 1980s, but football had constituted a unique sphere 
of meritocracy and chances for everyone. In the time I learned to know Omar, these days were 
long gone. For, as he continued, not without a stint of bitterness: 
Everything has changed. First there is no space to play [...] due to all congestion 
you know (‘ashan kul al-zahma ya‘ni). All empty spaces in Bab el-Hut have been 
occupied, by new buildings or parked cars. But the biggest problem is the 
corruption at the youth center (al-fisad fil-markiz). I worked there for a year; I 
know how it works. They [the state employees] work for themselves, not for the 
people. There is no hope. We have seen it for too long: state institutions just take 
our money. The corruption is everywhere. Everyone knows this. That is why most 
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normal people without contacts rather pay 100 EGP per hour to play football at a 
privately owned pitch than trying to book a slot at the markiz for 50 EGP. Because, 
they never know; they might not get the cheap slot they are promised anyway. It’s 
all about contacts (wasta), too much hassle.  
But the corruption did not only hinder Egypt’s youth from developing and flourishing. It had 
also affected Omar personally.  
I tell you something: the job I had at the marakiz was my dream job. Bab el-Hut is 
my home. But I had to quit because they did not let me do anything good. I started 
a new football school with proper match shirts and regular matches against teams 
coached by my friends at al-Ahly and al-Tersana [another famous Cairo club]. It 
became hugely popular and brought in much more money than those lazy ones had 
ever expected. I offered them a deal: I take half of the profit and the center gets 
half. It was my ideas and my contacts! But they refused. I told you, they’re corrupt. 
They promised me a lot, but in the end, they took everything. So I had to quit, even 
though I loved the kids and they loved me. [...] The football school they run now is 
useless compared to mine. You‘ve seen it, right? Sixty children on a small pitch 
with one non-professional coach who is just shouting! How can anyone improve 
under such conditions? 
Omar’s complaints about failed talent development, missed opportunities, and a dream 
job that were not meant to be articulate an ethnographic notion of corruption with a specific 
form and character. For him, like for many other men I met, the fisad that plagued Egyptian 
society went beyond individuals taking bribes and distributing privileges (although that was 
certainly part of the problem). Rather, corruption was an all-encompassing predicament of the 
era, comprising strained spatiality, a mentality of neglect, widespread laziness, defunct 
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institutions, chronic unemployment, and urban overcrowding. What Omar alluded to, in other 
words, was a complex of relations, materiality, money and discourse that “clogged up” 
channels for social mobility (Green 2008), which substituted vulgar aesthetics and brute force 
for meritocratic structures (Armbrust 1996), which rendered the future opaque and difficult to 
predict and actualize (Bear 2015), and which wore down subjects physically and mentally 
(Povinelli 2011). In short, corruption indexed all those obstacles that impeded men’s efforts to 
produce and reproduce private and public values and futures. It was systematic, and it was 
unavoidable. And it made it enormously difficult for men in Egypt to enact masculine 
conducts of productivity. 
Cleanliness 
It is important to stress that Egypt’s revolutionary period was not merely an historical 
juncture when the country’s endemic corruption was endlessly discussed and problematized. 
The years that followed the uprisings were likewise a point in time when institutions, 
activists, politicians, and individuals articulated initiatives for how to tackle the problem. To 
cleanse the clogged system, reintroduce a lost meritocracy, and somehow allow men to be 
productive, develop, and flourish were at the heart of the revolutionary project. This tendency 
was also very much visible at the markiz in Bab el-Hut. Mahmoud and Hossam might not 
have admitted that their institution had had a problem with corruption, but they were 
acknowledging that the center had to adapt to a new reality in the post-2011 nation. At the 
very least, the pressured state employees realized that they needed to revamp their image so to 
somewhat preempt the accusations that the general public directed at them. 
As part of this rethinking, the markiz saw a couple of novelties being introduced in 
late 2012 and early 2013. As state funding was drying up, the center came to host two 
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externally funded football tournaments. The first of these, Copa Coca-Cola, was a nationwide 
five-a-side tournament for 15-year old boys, played for the first time at Egypt’s marakiz al-
shabab between December 2012 and March 2013.8 The competition in Cairo began with 
qualification matches at each markiz, where the winning team qualified to the city final. After 
subsequent regional and national finals, the winner would represent Egypt in a global 
tournament in London the following summer. The cup was organized in cooperation between 
Coca-Cola and the Ministry of Youth. Whereas the ministry provided spaces to play – the 
pitches at the country’s marakiz al-shabab – Coca-Cola covered all other organizational costs: 
referees, balls, match shirts and, most spectacularly, an enormous advertisement campaign. 
For anyone following Egyptian sports media or just moving around Cairo in October 
and November 2012, Copa Coca-Cola must have come across as a very prominent football 
tournament. Commercials for the tournament, promising to “take the Egyptian youth all the 
way to London,” were run daily on television, and huge billboards were placed along 
motorways all over the capital. On the morning of the qualifications in Bab el-Hut, the 
promotion company Field Action – contracted by Coca-Cola to organize and run the event – 
spent hours dressing the youth center in Coca-Cola’s red and white colors, and the soft drink 
company’s FIFA World Cup 2010 hymn, “Wavin’ Flag,” was playing on repeat from 
oversized loudspeakers. For me, it all seemed like a giant marketing campaign for Coca-Cola, 
parachuted onto the governmental infrastructure that the marakiz provided. At the same time, 
the tournament was run faultlessly. The kids I spoke to seemed delighted that something out 
of the ordinary was happening, and they ensured me that they were having a great time. 
A good month later, in February 2013, I visited the tournament’s Cairo finals at 
another youth center in Nasser City, Eastern Cairo. At this later stage of the cup, the 
saturation of brands and commercials had been intensified yet another notch. In addition to 
the already extensive set-up that I had witnessed in Bab el-Hut, the kids playing were now 
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dressed up in brand new match shirts, shorts, and socks with Coca-Cola’s logotypes, and 
every player was given a can of Coke after each match. Furthermore, the entire event was 
recorded by a professional film team that did not hesitate to stop the matches at any time, so 
that they could enter the pitch and get the best close-ups or angles of the action. Frequently, 
the crew also instructed groups of youth who had gathered to watch the matches, either to 
cheer loudly or to behave more properly, all to make the event look suitable in what was to 
become a promotion video. 
When the day’s activities were over, I got the chance to talk to the representative for 
Coca-Cola in Egypt, who was sent out to supervise the event. Clearly, the company’s envoy 
was satisfied with how it had all developed: 
I think we’re doing a great job. Everything is really clean and professional. It’s a 
nice project for everyone. For us [at Coca-Cola], it’s great promotion, but it’s 
especially nice for the kids. You have to remember that most of them come from 
very poor areas. They’ve only played football in the streets and on marakiz al-
shabab before. To play in real shirts with brand names and to be filmed by a 
professional team is a great chance. You can see that they love it. It’s premium. 
The next day, I went to see Mahmoud in Bab el-Hut. I said that I visited yesterday’s cup in 
Nasser City, and I indicated that perhaps it was all a bit too commercialized. Did he also 
believe that the marketing campaign had been prioritized over the young boys’ football 
tournament, the presumed core activity? Mahmoud partly agreed: 
I know that you would say that, Carl. I could see that you didn’t like it when they 
were here in Bab el-Hut either; you’re such a socialist! Of course, all that 
marketing is nothing we asked for. But you have to understand that what they do is 
very professional. They’ve money; the organization is smooth; everything works. 
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We’ve not had a tournament like this, on all marakiz across Egypt, for decades. 
These guys know business (bizniz). It’s clean (nadif). It improves the image of 
what we’re doing. We need more of this, I think: to continue what we’re doing in 
this difficult time. But in a new way. 
*** 
If Mahmoud was mildly hesitant to the intentions behind Copa Coca-Cola, this was 
nothing in comparison with his colleague Hossam’s opinion of the second new tournament 
hosted at the center that winter. One day in January 2013, I noted a small sign on the wall 
outside the markiz, announcing that the Muslim Brotherhood’s political branch, the Freedom 
and Justice Party (FJP), would organize a Festival of Youth and Sports (mahragan shabab wi 
riyada) there the flowing week. As I read on the sign, the festival was a Cairo-wide football 
tournament for adult male teams, comprising qualification rounds on each markiz, followed 
by a district final and, eventually, a big all-Cairo final. 
At this point in time, the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated President 
Muhammad Mursi’s government was in rapid decline. After a brief period of calm following 
the presidential elections in Summer 2012, a bitter and in part violent rift had opened up 
between secularists and Islamists; less than six months later, in summer 2013, these tensions 
would escalate in massive anti-Mursi demonstrations, a military coup led by Field Marshal 
Abdel Fatah el-Sisi and a bloody clampdown against the Brotherhood. In the current climate, 
Hossam and Mahmoud – both stern secularists – were unwilling to even speak about the 
upcoming event. “We do not know much about that thing,” Hossam told me.  
Some ikhwani [Muslim Brotherhood member] came by one day and booked the 
football pitch for five consecutive nights. You cannot be sure what they really 
want. Why would they pay for such a thing? But in the end of the day, they rule the 
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country now. If they want to do something here and pay for it, fine for us. It is 
good that things are happening and that they try. But I’m not sure how many 
people will show up. It’s difficult to know. In any case, I don’t care what they do. 
I missed the first day of the Festival of Youth and Sports, but as I arrived to the youth center 
on day two, I could tell that Hossam’s reluctance toward the organizers constituted a minority 
position in Bab el-Hut. As a matter of fact, I had never seen the place as crowded. The whole 
neighborhood seemed to be there, either to play themselves or to watch their brothers, sons, or 
friends playing. The level of many of the matches was surprisingly high; clearly many of Bab 
el-Hut’s very best adult players participated. The organization was likewise impressive: the 
organizers had hired proper referees, a witty man was commentating on the matches through 
loudspeakers, and match results and goal scorers were listed on board next to the pitch. 
Except for Hossam and Mahmoud, who stubbornly spent the night drinking tea alone in their 
office, all of the coaches and many of the young boys who regularly played at the center were 
present. To my slight surprise, the FJP party functionaries, whom I had never seen before, 
seemed well-known to the neighborhood’s residents. At a break between two matches, one of 
them – a short man in his thirties in a brown suit and a Brotherhood-typical, well-groomed 
beard – approached me. He introduced himself as Ahmed, the leader for the local FJP-branch. 
When I told him who I was, he enthusiastically started to tell me about his party, the cup, and 
his ambitions for Egypt and Bab el-Hut in the future.  
The reason why we organize this tournament is simple. It makes us visible and it 
gives something to the people that the markiz has never delivered. You know the 
people who work here, don’t you? You know how they are. Corrupt. Sitting in their 
office, drinking tea and doing nothing; putting money in their own pockets. We in 
FJP want this to change, step by step. Of course, they don’t want us here, but what 
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can they do? We pay the rent, and the people like us. Over time, though, we will 
change things more profoundly through politics: replace employees, new laws and 
regulation. Everyone will benefit, especially the youth who play football. Finally, 
they will get a real chance to do something. Most of us are from the business 
sector, the real world. We know how to get things done. Insha’Allah, it will be 
more professional here as well. Respectable (muhtaram). Cleaner (andaf). 
Mismatch 
These vignettes from two externally organized football tournaments at a youth center 
in Cairo suggest that the Egyptian revolution was not merely manifest in demonstrations or at 
the ballot box. While both cups are possibly best understood as elaborate marketing events, it 
is also unquestionable that they stepped in to fill a function that employees at the markiz could 
not any longer carry out, due to lack of money, personnel, will or energy. The tournaments 
gave the center the opportunity to draw on financial and cultural capital of the powers that be 
in Egypt at the time. Reaching out to external actors within the private sector and country’s 
ruling political party, it allowed Mahmoud and Hossam, however reluctantly, to continue 
fulfilling their zeal and mission among Bab el-Hut’s youth. Moreover, while it is clear that 
men from Coca-Cola, FJP and the youth center itself sought to extract different types of value 
from the tournaments, my material also points to a shared ethics of masculine productivity 
tied to an idealization of transparency and cleanliness. No matter whom I talked to, the future 
envisioned and desired was one where the endemic troubles of corruption would be 
overcome. The tournaments promised to cleanse the clogged system that the youth centers 
embodied, a system which for too long had impeded men’s and boy’s efforts to be productive, 
work out, and flourish. 
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Omar, the youth coach, was well aware of these post-revolutionary developments at 
the youth center in the neighborhood he still called home. One day in February 2013, we met 
in a coffee shop just outside the markiz’s walls. When I asked him what he thought of the 
initiatives that were underway, he depicted them as a promising first step: 
These are the type of things the revolution should change. The guys in there 
[pointing at the wall] have already lost a lot of power. They do not get much 
support from the government (al-hukuma) any longer. That’s why they need to 
look for new money, from the private sector (al-qata‘ al-khas) and even from al-
ikhwan (The Muslim Brotherhood). This is a normal development and it is good. It 
will make it all cleaner, more professional. Hopefully, it’ll benefit the boys in Bab 
el-Hut. They need it. 
At the same time, Omar was well aware that the cleanliness that the revolution promised was 
unlikely to reach everyone. As anthropologist Samuli Schielke (2015, 181-182) and Jessica 
Winegar (2016) have both argued, aspirations to revolutionary cleansing and starting anew 
have in Egypt often been problematically classed projects, which risk disguising more 
systematic problems requiring thorough structural reforms. Omar had his very own 
experience of what a cleanliness that was not for everybody could look like. Three years as a 
youth coach at Wadi Degla club had granted him the opportunity to work on some of the best 
and cleanest facilities that Cairo could offer. Reflecting the Egyptian capital’s enormous class 
differences, Wadi Degla’s palm trees, swimming pools, coffee shops, and franchise 
restaurants were a world apart from the youth center in Bab el-Hut. As Omar would often tell 
me – with poorly concealed disappointment and a hint to the world’s injustices – the 
possibilities he had to teach the kids football skills were incredible. Whereas he had typically 
worked alone with 40 kids on the small five-a-side pitch in Bab el-Hut, the regulations of the 
23 
 
Arsenal Academy prescribed a maximum of 16 children for every two coaches and modern 
equipment suited for all kinds of exercises. Yet, as Omar explained, it was rare to find more 
than twelve players turning up at the training on any given day. “They have so many other 
things that they prioritize: school exams, vacations, music classes. The parents pay a lot for 
the academy, but it is not their first priority.” 
Partly due to these priorities, working at Wadi Degla had never lived up to Omar’s 
expectations. Surely, the facilities were great, and he knew that he was privileged to work 
intensively with small groups of players. But something was lacking. Once I asked him if he 
believed that the huge discrepancy in facilities was likely to tilt the class composition of 
Egypt’s professional football players – who traditionally stem from poorer social strata – 
towards higher classes in years to come. Somewhat surprisingly, his reply was a vehement 
“No”. “It is never going to happen,” he explained, 
It doesn’t matter how good pitches and well-educated coaches we have out here: 
these boys will never play for the national team. They’ll become engineers and 
doctors. The boys who really care about football, all the great talents, come from 
poor areas in Cairo or from the provinces. That’s where football is really important, 
where players take the time and have the passion to train hard, to do what’s 
necessary. Sometimes, that’s why I feel that what I’m doing here is useless. It’s all 
nice and shiny, but it’s not the real thing (mish ha’i’i). To be honest with you, this 
is child care, not talent development 
The way Omar drew a distinction between “child care” – being useless – and “talent 
development” – the “real thing” – does not only highlight what types of (masculine) 
productivity he considered valuable and worthy to engage in. His complaints also spoke to a 
particular kind of class inequality that he found deeply troubling. Later that same evening, in 
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the microbus on our way home to the city, Omar elaborated further on the mismatch between 
talents and facilities. Addressing the compromise that working at the Arsenal Academy 
entailed, he touched on a privatized and geographically concentrated cleanliness that did not 
reach the areas where it would matter the most. 
This is why I got so disappointed when I had to quit my job at the markiz [in Bab 
el-Hut]. I told you, that was my dream job. There were much more talent there than 
here in Degla. 100 times more! They would beat the rich kids I coach now easily, 
8-0. You cannot compare. But it didn’t work out because of the corruption. They 
laughed at me and they took all the money. It was not possible for me to make any 
money there where I really wanted to be, and where I could make a difference. 
This is what makes me sad. 
At the same time, Omar entertained the hope that perhaps, a new configuration of space, 
potentiality, and materiality was coming together. A new chance to return to Bab el-Hut in a 
role that allowed him to more efficiently work and extract value was possibly on the horizon: 
There is this new Spanish NGO. They came after the revolution. They’re investing 
in football pitches in poor neighborhoods; they try to set up professional but 
affordable football academies. They’ve already built facilities in Matariyya and 
Bulaq al-Dakrur. One of my friends works for them. I visited last week. It was 
great, new and clean. Not the same level as Wadi Degla, but good. Much better 
than marakiz al-shabab. Much better! And without the state employees. Now, they 
want to build a center in Bab el-Hut. A guy called me yesterday. They’re 




I asked him if he would leave the job at Wadi Degla if a chance to work for the Spanish NGO 
occurred. I could tell that this was no easy choice. 
Obviously, there’s a risk. I am making decent money at Degla and I might get 
promoted. But at the same time, this is a chance to do something that I really want 
to do. Finally, someone is starting something clean and professional also in my 
area. Without corruption. I think this can give the shabab who have the talent a real 
chance to improve. I can set up my own academy and hopefully form a competitive 
team. And you know what, their business model is that they develop talents and 
sell them to the big clubs. As a coach, you can even get part of the profit. So even 
if the salary isn’t that great, I think it could be a chance for me as well. If we work 
hard, we will all profit: the youth, the Spanish guys, and I. 
Conclusion – Revolutionary Promises 
When I last visited Bab el-Hut in October 2016, the revolutionary years felt very 
distant, indeed. At the youth center, it was almost as if the turmoil in 2012 and 2013 had 
never happened. While critical of some of the President el-Sisi’s latest statements, Mahmoud9 
was overall content with the policies of the new government. He assured me that things were 
now getting “back to normal” at the center as well as in the country. Whereas Copa Coca-
Cola was still an annual event, the Festival of Youth and Sports had been a one-off thing. The 
fact that that the center had co-organized a tournament with the now terror-labeled Muslim 
Brotherhood just a few years earlier was not an issue Mahmoud felt like talking about. 
Although the center was full of noisy kids, a new sense of calm was noticeable. The urge to 
restructure activities and bring in external money and actors seemingly belonged to the past.  
During the same visit to Cairo, I also met Omar. For him, the last few years had been 
tough. The Spanish NGO’s plans for a new type of football academy had not come through. 
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When I asked him about it, he first did not understand what I was talking about. When he 
finally did recall the project, he mumbled something about a person that had never called 
back. In fact, Omar had stopped coaching altogether over the past two years. Instead, he had 
invested some hard-earned savings in a small shop selling sports clothes in an alleyway in 
Bab el-Hut. As we met, his business was struggling badly, in particular as a result of the 
drastic devaluation of the Egyptian pound, which made imports very expensive. He had 
several plans for getting back into coaching. Yet, as he also acknowledged, he had opened the 
shop to get more stability needed to support his family. To once again rush into new and 
uncertain projects was not an option for the time being. 
And yet, the fact that Mahmoud’s youth center is “back to normal” and Omar’s bold 
dreams from 2012 and 2013 are unlikely to materialize does not make their stories irrelevant 
to ponder. In contrast, I would say that this makes the ethnographic material contained in this 
article all the more revealing. For, what my material about youth football at and around the 
markiz in Bab el-Hut illustrates well is how the revolutionary years instigated and made 
visible a multiplicity of novel projects and ideals for how to be a productive, future-making 
Egyptian man. Whether in Hossam and Mahmoud’s struggle to cast off criticism of corruption 
and keep the activities running in the tournaments organized by Coca Cola and the Freedom 
and Justice Party, or in Omar trying to create spaces to work and flourish, what we see are 
attempts to generate private and public value, regulated by overlapping (and sometimes 
contradictory) conducts of productivity. Very often, these projects were explicitly designed to 
anticipate, act on, and mold desirable futures. To work with and on Egypt’s shabab, after all, 
is by definition a speculative enterprise aimed at “bringing futures in to being” (Bear, 2015: 
19). At other times and in other contexts, though, the various initiatives that the men I met 
engaged in were more than anything a matter of survival. To creatively generate productivity 
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and value was here a requirement for merely staying afloat, in a world and in an era that were 
highly uncertain and constantly on the move. 
Without a doubt, the time period between 2012 and 2013 that this article considers 
was an exceptionally ephemeral one for a great many Egyptian men. As scholars such as 
David Scott (2014) and Hannah Arendt (1963) have famously argued, revolutions are the 
epitome of contingency and dislocation, moments in time when possibilities seem endless and 
when bold human actors – most often male – can intervene in history and potentially change 
worlds.10 But it is never only a matter of grabbing power and doing politics. As the 
ethnography in this article has suggested, revolutions can also be historical junctures, at which 
more mundane possibilities for being an agile and productive man expand. To get a better 
sense of how such a proliferation of masculinized possibilities could be experienced, let us 
once again turn to Omar and his life and dreams in those heady years. As we have seen, Omar 
often mobilized youth football – the world he knew the best – as a metonym, both for the ills 
of the old regime and for revolution’s promises: how a previously broadly meritocratic 
system in the last decades had been “corrupted” by greedy state-employees and strained urban 
space; how the private sector, with its unmatched yet unequally distributed resources, 
provided cleanliness and professionalism merely for a negligible and largely untalented elite; 
but also, how the last year of turmoil had come to break down the state’s monopoly, as 
external financial resources and actors were knocking on the door.  
Regardless of its many uncertainties, therefore, the revolution was for Omar largely a 
force for good. New private initiatives, such as the ones currently underway at Cairo’s youth 
centers, promised more transparency, a more appropriate distribution of material facilities, 
and a plethora of cleaner pathways towards brighter and more promising futures. Even as late 
as the winter of 2013 – more than two years after the beginning of the uprisings on Tahrir 
Square – the political transformations lumped together as al-thawra (the revolution) looked 
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set to reinstate a long lost meritocracy, which the last decade of corruption efficiently had 
crushed: it would introduce a fairer playing field for all, on which Bab el-Hut’s wealth of 
talent would be allowed to develop, grow and flourish.11 What is more, on a more personal 
level, Omar also entertained an anticipation that the revolutionary process would allow him to 
combine productive generation of value in his own life – money to realize the dreams he had 
for his family – with the development of football talent that he felt so very passionately about. 
In contrast to in the corrupt past, when he had always found himself working on these futures 
somewhat out of sync – forced to choose between personal prosperity and professional zeal – 
revolutionary Egypt would be a place where his diverging ambitions and projects finally 
linked up in some sort of harmony.  
Finally, then, what becomes legible from the theoretical ponderings and ethnographic 
vignettes presented in this paper is a notion of masculinity as a temporal enigma: as a set of 
ambiguities between discordant futures that leave material needs, familial care, and 
development of the neighborhood’s talents difficult to reconcile. In addition, what we also see 
surfacing is a particular vision of the idealized object conjured up among my interlocutors as 
the “revolution.” For, while it is certainly true that the experience of Egypt’s revolutionary 
years was disorienting and fractured one – squeezed between political promises, personal 
anxieties, and numbing economic uncertainties (Schielke 2015; Ahlberg 2017) –ideals for 
what the revolution ought to be rather alluded to a re-captured synchronicity between social 
and individual futures. At the very least, this was at the core of what Omar envisioned 
regarding what the revolutionary transformation would grant him and the youth playing 
football in Bab el-Hut. In short, Omar hoped that he would become a truly productive man: a 
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Since then, the Egyptian currency market rate has been drastically devalued. The exchange rate at the time of writing 
(October 2017) is 17.6 EGP per USD. The currency conversions found throughout this article reflect the exchange 
rate in early 2013. 
6 Private football academies are a recent phenomenon in Cairo. They are relatively expensive football schools for 
children and teenagers. Like the one in Wadi Degla, academies in Egypt are often run in (very loose) cooperation 
with one or another famous European club. 
7 The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, fourth edition. 
8 The cup tournament has since then turned into an annual event. 
9 Hossam had quit the job in Bab el-Hut and moved on to another center. 
10 For a critical discussion of the way in which iconic revolutionaries and exceptional events tend to be gendered, see 
Winegar 2012.  
11 This understanding of the revolution as a way to (re-)create meritocracy strongly echoes promises articulated by 
the Nasserist “revolution” in the 1950s and 1960s (see e.g. Mossallam 2014). 
                                                 
